Wednesday, January 18, 2017

Now that some law schools are really closing, what will make other universities pull the trigger?

After years of speculation, law schools are actually closing and that is big news. Most saliently, Indiana Tech announced that its law school will close at the end of this academic year at a loss of $20 million (here), a story the National Law Journal named as one of its top five stories of the year on legal education (here). Charlotte School of Law's continued existence is in significant doubt because it can no longer participate in federal student aid programs. (here and here). Hamline University closed its law school with more stealth, but no less certainty, by giving or selling it to William Mitchell College of Law, a cross-town competitor (here and here).

It is tempting to extrapolate from these schools and predict that universities will be most likely to close law schools that (a) are start-ups, (b) have low admissions criteria coupled with poor bar passage, (c) are not the most prestigious school in a crowded regional market, or (d) are losing considerable amounts of money. But the experience of dentistry, where 12% of schools closed -- equivalent to 24 law schools -- suggests that these factors will not be the crucial ones in predicting which law schools are at risk of closing.

In both dentistry and law, a tectonic shift and contraction in the profession led to a collapse in the admissions market and a crisis in the professional schools. That crisis caused several universities to close their dental schools.

Continue reading "Now that some law schools are really closing, what will make other universities pull the trigger?"

Posted by Eric Chiappinelli on January 18, 2017 at 04:49 PM in Life of Law Schools | Permalink | Comments (4)

What Vets Know That Physicians Don't?

Barbara Natterson-Horowitz, M.D., is a cardiologist who has made a name for herself as a thoughtful observer of both veterinarians and the veterinary patients whose heart cases she occasionally consults on. It is not entirely surprising that an M.D. cardiologist (or, as another example,  a dental surgeon) might be asked to consult on a complex veterinary case, particularly one involving a mammal.  Those who ask her to consult believe that she  has something to add to the treatment team.

What makes her a bit more unusual is her observation that the veterinary treatment team may have something to offer the M.D.: insights often drawn from the close study of veterinary patients who demonstrate their physical or psychic pain or disease in ways that require keen observation across a breed and, even sometimes, between breeds. Wondering if certain symptoms or behaviors in humans, closely observed, might allow M.D.'s to tap into veterinary knowledge, Dr. Natterson-Horowitz has joined with a group of veterinarians and M.D.'s to pursue these interests.

You may have seen her TedMed talk or read her book.

Whether or not the "One Health" approach to clinical and veterinary medicine will lead us anywhere beyond the insight that vets and physicians might have somethings to talk about remains to be seen. But the entry of the Oncept canine oral melanoma vaccine into the animal health care market is thought provoking. Oncept is not a true  vaccine in that it is not a canine oral  melanoma preventive. Rather it is administered post-diagnosis in serial doses that appear to have some substantial success in prolonging canine lifespan post-diagnosis.  Interestingly, Oncept is reported to have been, at one point,  in joint clinical trials for possible human use. This joint canine-human drug development track is not a common story, though a number of drugs are tested on canines as a precursor to clinical drug trials involving humans. 

Oncept is not inexpensive.  The Los Angeles Times estimated in June of this past year that  a full series of four treatments cost approximately $2,800.  Clearly, many pet owners are likely priced out of this market. Pet health insurance is uncommon and, even when present, often excludes pre-existing  conditions and the coverage of older dogs.  It should be noted that these same pet owning individuals and households are likely also priced out of many of the other new cancer treatments now offered for pets (sometimes offered using medical equipment down-scaled from human cancer treatment clinics).

Just as you might imagine, households with higher incomes and greater wealth will often spend substantially more money  than low and moderate income households on a pet  nearing the end of life. A new paper by Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein and Atul Gupta considers the expenditure differential in these situations.

Vets who deal with life-ending or gravely life-threatening illnesses like canine oral melanoma seem to have considerable experience with helping pet owners sort through the complicated issues of cost and benefit, both to pet and to household, in treatment decisions at or near the end of life.  Maybe this is what vets really know.

Posted by Ann Marie Marciarille on January 18, 2017 at 09:03 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)

Donald Trump and civil procedure

Donald Trump undoubtedly hates procedure, because it may interfere with his focus on substantive ends (unless procedure furthers his substantive ends--see College, Electoral). But all the litigation surrounding Trump and his businesses can be a boon for teaching and illustrating procedure. My fall Evidence exam was all Trump University. Now we have the defamation lawsuit by former Apprentice contestant Summer Zervos, alleging that Trump defamed her when he called her a liar in denying allegations that he sexually assaulted her. Merits aside, the case could be used to set-up and demonstrate a number of procedural issues.

For now, I want to focus on what the plaintiff's strategic choices tell us about diversity jurisdiction, at least from a plaintiff's standpoint. Diversity supposedly exists so the out-of-stater, forced to come into the state to litigate (I doubt Zervos could have gotten Trump into court in any other state), can find a neutral forum that will not favor the local over the foreigner. But here, a Californian filed a state-law action in New York against a New Yorker in state court.  It is worth thinking about that choice. One possibility is that Trump is unpopular in New York, so the federal forum is unnecessary. Another is that federal procedure has become so plaintiff-unfriendly that plaintiffs would rather take their chances with state procedure, even against a local. Or maybe that original assumption--federal courts are better because more free of local bias--was never true. Or if it was, it is not anymore. As I said, good discussion and/or exam fodder.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 18, 2017 at 07:55 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, January 17, 2017

AALS annual meeting: a quick postscript

After reviewing the various posts about the annual meeting generated by Paul H., et al, I stumbled across these related posts, here, here, here, and here, from an anonymous law prof at ATL.  There is a lot of interesting stuff there and I encourage you to have a look.

Posted by Dan Rodriguez on January 17, 2017 at 07:51 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

AALS: A Learned Society still Learning!

I am happy to align myself 100% with Paul Horwitz in his magnificent post (a Jerry Maguirean Manifesto, perhaps?).   Yes, yes, and again yes, to everything he says.

Having insisted, with Mark Tushnet, that the AALS is a trade ass'n advocating vigorously on behalf of its member schools, Paul (and Orin, too) rightly insist that the organization can and should function as a learned society, this for the benefit of the hard-working law profs whose skills, energies, and commitments are essential to our collective mission.  To be sure, "can function" doesn't mean "does function" and the extensive constructive suggestions about to improve both the performance of the AALS and, in particular, the annual meeting, should be welcome by anyone -- especially by the volunteers who after all configure nearly every one of the panels and also the meeting's theme -- who cares about our learned profession.  Let's all get to work on making the meeting great . . . nope, I won't go there.

Where I would like to pivot next, in some other posts, is how the association's role as advocate for its member law schools can be reconciled with two important considerations: (1) the welfare of the community of law profs who work within these schools; and (2) the problems that exist and persist within AALS member schools.  Paul raises shrewdly just this point when he raises the question -- more of a challenge really -- of how the AALS can advocate energetically for law schools qua law schools while also advocating on behalf of legal education and the values for which our educational endeavors stand.  These two complex considerations can reveal tensions in AALS mission, and also its performance.  We would do well to unpack, and not elide, these tensions.  

Posted by Dan Rodriguez on January 17, 2017 at 07:19 PM in Life of Law Schools | Permalink | Comments (2)

Antitrust or corporate speech?

Is this supposed plan among San Diego-area (and possibly Los Angeles-based) moving companies not to take any jobs related to the Chargers move to L.A. an antitrust violation? I know consumer boycotts are protected free-speech. But isn't an agreement among members of an industry not to engage in certain business behavior the anti-competitive collusion the antitrust laws prohibit? Is it different if the collusion is for expressive purposes? And if so, wouldn't that swallow the antitrust laws, because companies always would argue that their business decisions were driven by political concerns?

Besides what better captures the sadness of a franchise relocation?

Images

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 17, 2017 at 08:34 AM in First Amendment, Howard Wasserman, Sports | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, January 16, 2017

AALS as Trade Association vs. Learned Society, and Whether or How it Matters

This is my last post, God willing, on the AALS annual meeting. In my first post, I argued, in a nutshell, that the AALS is the American legal academy's learned society; that this is a reason to welcome and defend it against its harsher critics; that the AALS or individual executives, treating the organization more as a kind of trade association than a learned society, "have sometimes been too willing to cast themselves in the role of defenders of and advocates for law schools and legal education, rather than academicizing these questions and treating them as subjects for dispassionate and disinterested study"; and that this reflected itself this year in the annual meeting theme, "Why Law Matters," which a) assumed the answer to a genuine question and b) focused in substantial part not on why law matters, but on why American legal education and law schools matter. I did my best to display some sympathy and understanding and to recognize some of the organizational dynamics that push it in this direction, but I was still critical. 

In response, a couple of posters here and elsewhere, and one commenter on my post, pushed back on the assumption that the AALS is a learned society rather than a trade association. Mark Tushnet wrote at Balkinization that unlike most academic learned societies, the AALS is organized by law schools rather than by law professors, and said that "[t]he AALS's structure means that it almost necessarily must be something like a trade association for law schools--perhaps with something like a learned society attached to it once a year." "There is in fact," he said strikingly, "no 'learned society' for legal academics." Given that, Tushnet argued, "it's actually something of an achievement that the AALS's annual program has become as intellectually substantial as it is now." Here at Prawfsblawg, Dan Rodriguez offers a short post worth reading in its entirety. Here's a substantial chunk of the post:

[The AALS] is an association of law schools, not an association of law professors. Always has been. Perhaps there is an important place in the academy for an organization of law professors (other academic professions have such associations), but that is not the mandate, the purpose, or the function of the AALS....Prof. Mark Tushnet got us nicely riled up many years ago when he set out as the theme of his presidency, the idea of the AALS as a learned society. Whatever power this had as a normative prescription, and as an exhortation to improve the academic programming of the annual meeting and other AALS conferences, it created a trap to which Paul and other distinguished law profs have fallen into, which is seeing the AALS as an entity whose primary purpose is providing professional development opportunities and good intellectual content for a hungry professoriat. Worthy endeavors indeed (hence the great suggestions for improving the meeting), but AALS functions principally, and by design, to reflect and represent the interests of member law schools....While the AALS surely ought to focus a good part of its attention and resources on providing meaningful opportunities for law professors to engage, to exchange scholarly and pedagogical ideas,...we do our member law schools a disservice to evade and avoid squarely acknowledging its function as a trade association and an interest group.

Dan and Mark, for those of you who may not know, are both past presidents of the AALS, as well as individuals I know and admire. I have not researched the range of disciplinary associations of whatever kind, and am happy to defer to their description. I did note in my original post that "ours is a learned society related to a regulated profession, and thus faces some distinct issues, as opposed to the questions that face, say, a learned society of historians or literature professors"; if that's not a recognition that the AALS is formally a "trade association" rather than a learned society, it's at least an acknowledgment that there are reasons why it might lean in that direction. (In that sense, it's relevant that Mark points out that when he looked into it during his presidency, "the only other profession that had only an association of schools and not an association of professors was dentistry"--another regulated profession. Without my having canvassed the issue fully, note similarly the existence and function of the Association of American Medical Colleges.) So, okay, let's concede, at least arguendo, that the AALS is a trade association, albeit one that also holds an annual meeting that looks a lot like those of other academic disciplines--with more content on legal education itself, perhaps, but also with substantive programs on particular legal subjects. What then? Does it affect my criticisms, and if so how? 

As usual, my friend Orin Kerr asks the questions I would ask, and more economically, in his comments on Dan's post. One might put it simply and sympathetically by noting that, even if (as Dan argues in the comments to his post) there is no "tension" between its functions, they may make for odd bedfellows. One wouldn't expect a trade association based on the membership of individual existing law schools to argue in its official capacity, say, that some 20 or more of them ought to shut down. (I'm not averse to this argument, but neither is it an article of faith for me.) But one might expect an individual legal academic--and most key AALS officers are legal academics--to argue just that upon academic reflection. One wouldn't expect the AALS to argue that law doesn't matter, or matter much; or that whether it matters or not has little to do with whether law schools matter; or that law schools' academic function ought to be such as to exclude various measures--proliferating LL.M. programs, various one-year "certificates" that coincidentally and happily provide much-needed income, and so on--that might be crucial to some schools' survival or well-being. But an individual legal academic might conclude just that. "Tension?" Maybe not, as long as individual speakers are free to press that point at the annual meeting and in the Journal of Legal Education, as they are. (A nice test case might be a proposed "Hot Topic" program like "First, Let's Kill All the Law Schools" or "Law School Monopolies, Public Choice, and the Economic Incentives for Law School 'Innovation.'") "Odd bedfellows?" I don't think that's an especially harsh or implausible description.  

Then there is the question of the fact of the annual meeting. Again, I'm a defender of the annual meeting, and, like Dan and Mark, I think it's better than its most convinced critics argue, although obviously it's imperfect (what isn't?) and I suggested some reforms. But we might well ask why, if the AALS is a trade association first and foremost, and one organized around law schools rather than individual law professors, it exists at all. We might treat it as lagniappe. There's a flavor of this in Dan and Mark's posts. They write, respectively, that "what is more surprising to me is that the AALS has maintained such strong attendance and loyalty, warts and all," and that "it's actually something of an achievement that the AALS's annual program has become as intellectually substantial as it is now." Both of them have pushed to make the annual meeting better, however, and I don't think either of them think the reaction of law professors to the notion that an annual meeting is kind of a bonus should be gratitude and silence.

But another way to read the fact of the annual meeting is that the AALS is, functionally if not formally, at least in part a learned society, and that it wants to be and/or holds itself out to be one. The by-laws and membership structure may cut against that, or against viewing it only as a learned society. But law professors have, for lo these past hundred years (or several hundred), often argued that form can be less important than function, that organizations evolve within or despite their formal structures, that we should not elevate process over substance, and so on. So maybe the "trade association" answer is not complete. And that point is enhanced when we reflect that even if the annual meeting itself includes many programs on legal education, the AALS also holds subject-specific midyear meetings, and that many of its annual distinguished speakers end up speaking about law, or legal academic work, not just about law schools and their welfare. 

Again, I'm happy to concede that the AALS is at least a trade association, although possibly not only one, or that is a trade association "with a difference." Both Mark and Dan, as I understand them, don't rest absolutely on this point. That is, they still think the annual meeting is important and don't think it should be immune from criticism and reform, including suggestions about how to make the annual meeting itself more academically useful, just because it could dispense with an annual meeting (or midyear meetings) altogether, or limit it to a meeting of law school administrators, or what have you. And it is at least possible that we might think of the AALS in the end as being neither fish nor fowl. The question then would be whether we think of it as being free to be imperfect at both functions, or demand that be excellent at both, or suggest that it divest itself of its "learned society"-type functions, or something else.   

I come out somewhere like the following. 1) Okay, it's a trade association. 2) For many intents and purposes, the presence of things like the annual and midyear meetings suggest that it is also, in function and in the understanding of most law professors if not in form, a learned society. As Dan notes, if there has been confusion on the part of law professors about this, it's a more-than-natural confusion. But I think it's more than just confusion; it is now part of the identity of the AALS, membership structure notwithstanding. 3) Insofar as it is a trade association, I have much less (or no) cause to complain when the AALS or its executives speak up in the interest of legal education and law schools themselves. 4) Insofar as it also conducts meetings that conform more closely to the learned society model, it should at least give thought to making sure that its annual themes and programs are fairly academic in nature, broadly understood (I see nothing wrong with programs on teaching better, for instance). The AALS might need to lobby others, but it doesn't need to lobby or convince individual law professors attending the annual meeting. I don't want to attach more importance to it than is warranted, but I still take the general view that "Why Law Matters" is an imperfect theme from that perspective, especially when married to arguments that law mattering is the same as something like current legal education or law schools mattering. In dealing with others, it may take a more emphatic position (which, as it comes from a trade association, individual law professors may critique or take with a grain of salt; the conclusions of individual law professors need not conform to the interests of individual law schools, or existing legal education as a whole). At the annual meeting, it should be very catholic and open-minded about such questions. 5) Law professors are free to push for at least some aspects of the AALS to conform more closely to the model of a learned society. Doing so may create, or enhance, tensions between those different functions that might not otherwise exist. So be it.

Even at this length, this post is just a starting point on this issue, which clearly requires more introspection and discussion from law professors themselves, myself included. Mark and Dan have given us a lot to think about.      

Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 16, 2017 at 10:39 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sponsore Post: West Study Aids

The following post is by Anna Lawless-Collins, Associate Director for Systems and Collection Services at Boston University Law School, and is sponsored by West Academic.

The Fineman and Pappas Law Libraries at Boston University added the West Academic Study Aids Subscription in April 2016, just in time to help with end-of-year exams, and it was an immediate hit with our students. We went on a marketing blitz (aided by materials sent by West Academic) and set out table tents, posted flyers, added slides to the law school's slide show, blogged about it, and handed out materials at the circulation desk. We even wore buttons encouraging students to ask us about using the materials. Students told our library director, Ron Wheeler, that they find the online versions infinitely better than the print reserve materials - not least because they can use them anytime and anywhere. They don't have to worry about other students returning the materials late or the print versions going missing.

Continue reading "Sponsore Post: West Study Aids"

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 16, 2017 at 09:31 AM in Howard Wasserman, Sponsored Announcements, Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, January 13, 2017

Procedure returns to SCOTUS docket

SCOTUS granted cert in sixteen new cases today. Several involve procedure/fed courts issues, including:

• The scope of general personal jurisdiction over a U.S.-based company in a state.

• In what court a fired federal employee can challenge rejection of the Merit Systems Protection Board decision, when the Board concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over a "mixed case" involving both a firing and a violation of federal employment-discrimination law.

• Whether intervenors in federal court must establish Article III standing or whether it is enough that the original parties have standing. (This issue has been around for awhile and came up back during the marriage-equality litigation).

Looks like I will have some stuff to write about late in the Term.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 13, 2017 at 05:15 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

The revolution in law practice was much like this profession's revolution

Ann Marie Marciarille had a very good recent post (here) about Brad Smith's talk at the AALS annual meeting. Smith noted that dentistry lacks diversity nearly as much as law does and off handedly said, "Why, I have no idea." Professor Marciarille used that remark to reflect on a common tendency we have to be, as she said, "uncurious" about things that may be just outside our own world. She then elaborated on some of the causes of dentistry's lack of diversity.

In that same vein, I have been struck by the similarities between the revolutions in the practice of dentistry and the practice of law. The parallels are vivid.

Continue reading "The revolution in law practice was much like this profession's revolution"

Posted by Eric Chiappinelli on January 13, 2017 at 01:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (2)

The Blue Inhaler

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I carry an albuterol inhaler as my  quick relief medication for asthma. I use it infrequently, which is good news for me and good news for my asthma. Known in many other countries as the blue inhaler or the blue puffer, albuterol/salbutemol is a tremendously popular and effective relief inhaler.  First brought to market in the 1980's, sales of the blue inhaler have grown as have rates of asthma diagnosis.  

Traveling recently in the E.U., my albuterol inhaler stopped working short of its full number of available measured doses. And so I was off to my neighborhood pharmacy in  Ponta Delgada, hoping that a licensed pharmacist might be able to prescribe inhaled albuterol over the counter and spare me the quest for the Centro de Saude on New Year's Day.  Frequent travelers are no doubt aware that certain prescription only medications in the United States may be sold over the counter in other countries or dispensed at the discretion of a licensed pharmacist, even in the absence of a prescription, in still  other countries.

Continue reading "The Blue Inhaler"

Posted by Ann Marie Marciarille on January 13, 2017 at 11:00 AM in Current Affairs, International Law, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Last of its kind?

DOJ has entered into a consent decree with the Baltimore Police Department in a § 14141 action. As with many of the consent decrees we have seen from the Obama DOJ, it requires extensive changes to department policies and practices with respect to use of force, community engagement, and respect for the rights of people to speak and protest in public and to observe and record police activity. It also requires development of new practices with respect to transporting persons in custody and dealing with people with behavioral disabilities.

The question is whether this is the last such consent decree we see for awhile. Jeff Sessions does not appear to see systemic unconstitutionality in state and local police departments, nor does he appear to believe that the federal government and federal courts should oversee the operations of local agencies. It is unlikely that whoever Bush Trump appoints to head the Civil Rights Division will take a much different view of the matter. Extensive use of consent decrees through § 14141 is not in the Republican playbook--the Bush DOJ brought few civil actions and entered few consent decrees, preferring to engage in informal negotiations and letters of agreement, a less-adversarial/more-cooperative approach that does not necessarily produce as comprehensive reforms.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 13, 2017 at 12:28 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, First Amendment, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, January 12, 2017

Can President Trump fire the DOJ inspector general without waiting thirty days after giving Congress a reason?

According to the Washington Post, Michael Horowitz, DOJ inspector general, has just announced that he will be conducting a "wide-ranging" investigation inyo "broad allegations of misconduct involving the FBI’s investigation of Hillary Clinton’s email practices and the bureau’s controversial decision shortly before the election to announce the probe had resumed."

Time, of course, is running out for such an inspection to be completed before Trump becomes President. But federal law seems to give Horowitz a little extra time to investigate even after Trump assumes office. Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, President Trump must "communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer." In theory, therefore, Horowitz has thirty days to investigate, using the substantial powers of his office, after Trump gives his reasons for removing Horowitz. (If President Obama's reason-giving under the IG Act is any precedent, those reasons need not be very detailed: When Obama fired Gerald Walpin, the IG for the Corporation for National and Community Service, Obama simply stated to Congress that he "lacked the fullest confidence" in Walpin). Although those reason-giving requirements seem pretty toothless, the 30-day warning seems to be a hard and fast statutory requirement, meaning that Horowitz gets his month to raise hell.

But is this 30-day advance warning consistent with the President's Article II powers to execute the laws? The OLC offered an opinion back in 1977 that the 30-day limit on the President's removal power was unconstitutional, and I am not sure that OLC was mistaken. In 2008, the House tried to protect the IGs' independence with even greater insulation from presidential control with H.R. 928, a bill that would have required good cause for IGs' removal, but the Senate deleted such insulation from the bill after the OMB argued that the for-cause provision would unconstitutionally intrude on presidential authority.

Given mushy precedents like Morrison v. Olson, the 30-day requirement might be constitutional even if a full-blown for-cause limit would violate Article II. But, looking at the big picture and putting petty doctrinal considerations aside, we can say one thing for sure:

The 30-day limit makes for great constitutional law final exam question.

Posted by Rick Hills on January 12, 2017 at 02:22 PM | Permalink | Comments (2)

Third Annual Civil Procedure Workshop

The following is posted on behalf of Brooke Coleman (Seattle), David Marcus (Arizona), and Elizabeth Porter (Washington).

We are excited to announce the third annual Civil Procedure Workshop, to be co-hosted by the University of Arizona Rogers College of Law, the University of Washington School of Law, and Seattle University School of Law. The CPW will be held at the University of Arizona in Tucson on November 3-4, 2017.

Continue reading "Third Annual Civil Procedure Workshop"

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 12, 2017 at 01:36 PM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 11, 2017

Jokes About Dentists

Having just returned from AALS, I have been thinking about all I saw and heard at the conference. I attended some outstanding panels and talks but it is Brad Smith's Plenary Program talk on Preparing a Diverse Profession to Serve a Diverse World that I can't get out of my head. Actually, Brad Smith, President and Chief Legal Officer of Microsoft Corporation, did not really speak on his assigned topic. His talk, though interesting, was really about how disruptive technologies have changed the world and will continue to change the world.  (If his remarks in the panel discussion following his formal  remarks were more focused on the announced topic, I cannot say as I regret I had to leave the Plenary Program just after the conclusion of his formal remarks.)

Brad Smith did briefly discuss the lack of diversity in the legal profession -- noting that law is the least diverse profession, followed only by dentistry.  This last observation about the lack of diversity in the dental profession,  earned Mr. Smith his biggest laugh of the speech when he added "why, I have no idea."

Of course, it was funny in an offhand way. But it was also a marker of how uncurious we can all be about things, how uncurious we can all choose to be, and how even those of us who pride ourselves on promoting innovation can think in remarkably static ways.

That roughly three and a half percent of all American  dentists are African American  can tell us some things about the legacy of exclusion on the basis of race from dental education and the dental profession in the United States.   That African American dentists overwhelmingly serve the African American community (with a reported 62 percent same race patient panel) can also tell us some things about patterns of dental practice.

A story could also be told about how dentistry's move from an apprenticed trade to a profession arguably made the dental profession less diverse. The rise of the university-affiliated licensed dental school in the late nineteen century (first at the University of Maryland) made the roughly 120 apprentice-trained African American dentists anachronisms. Only slowly did African American enrollment in these new style dental schools grow.

Dentistry, for some time, has been a contracting profession. For a considerable period of time, few new dental schools opened and a number of dental schools closed.  The profession contracted but not uniformly as African Americans disproportionately disappeared from dental schools and from the ranks of practicing dentists.

Of course, many factors are at play. Dentistry has grayed during this period. Dental education is now overwhelmingly debt financed making the path more challenging for those who will not move into a family-owned or associated practice.  Dental services are often uninsured in the United States and more often paid out of pocket. Even Americans with the best known "dental insurance" plans often have a form of coverage that might more accurately be described as pre-paid dental for prophylactic care or limited "dental coverage" for actual low risk, high cost dental events. In short, it is not an easy time to launch a dental practice. 

The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts the demand for dental services will continue to substantially outstrip supply.  As most dental students form the intention to enter dental school through exposure to family members and friends in the field, we should all give a thought to how technology and innovation might play a role in opening the world of possibility for a more diverse dental profession.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Posted by Ann Marie Marciarille on January 11, 2017 at 11:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (10)

AALS Addendum I: More On "Taking Attendance"

I'm grateful to those who read and commented on my series of posts on the AALS annual meeting, especially but not limited to Mark Tushnet and Dan Rodriguez, who are both past presidents of the AALS. I hope the posts afforded some food for thought, and a little amusement, for those attending the meeting. Let me say again that the three of us have something important in common: We are all inclined to be supporters, not detractors, of the AALS and its annual meeting. As I wrote in my first post, my series of suggestions was intended neither to praise nor to bury the AALS. On the whole, I find the annual meeting useful, and better than its more fervent critics are wont to suggest. No institution or annual gathering is perfect or exempt from criticism. But I am and hope to remain involved in the AALS, both at the section level and in the central organization itself, and I would rather be a part of it, while sometimes waxing critical or pushing reforms, than deride it altogether, boycott it, or give up on the idea of a central organization and gathering for legal academics. On the other hand, I'm always much more interested in criticizing the things I like or am sympathetic to than the things or people I completely disagree with or disdain. Let me also repeat what I said often during the series: my proposals were in the nature of "modest proposals," with at least something of a Swiftian touch. I understood at the outset that it's highly unlikely that the AALS will take attendance at meetings and send that information to deans, or honor overexposed speakers with a gold watch and a five-year ban on speaking. The extreme nature of the proposals served to place the issues they were raising in high relief and provoke discussion. As it turned out, and I suspect this is often the case with semi-Swiftian satirists, and with all authors who make proposals, by the end I was more attached to the proposals themselves than might have been my original intention, and I am now inclined to think it's actually not a bad idea at all to take attendance or come up with draconian rules to deal with extreme "usual suspects" at the AALS annual meeting. Still, I expected readers to take the particulars of those proposals with a large grain of salt and focus on the issues themselves, even if I am now inclined to take the proposals more seriously than I initially intended.  

I was grateful to those readers who pushed back on the "take attendance" proposal, which was meant to deal with "lobby-sitters" and "dinner-with-friends" attendees of the meeting, who rarely darken the door of actual program meetings. The upshot of the pushback was that meeting people outside the meeting rooms is a valuable form of professional networking and should not be knocked too readily or loosely. On the whole, I am happy to agree. One might view differently those social gatherings that have more to do with catching up and hanging out with friends per se, and less or little to do with catching up on each other's work. Setting that aside, I'm quite willing to agree that there is value in professional networking--and in some or many cases, it's not just value to oneself or one's personal advancement, crudely defined, but value to the legal academy, insofar as it involves learning about others' work, exposing others to one's own work, learning about what's taking place at other schools, and so on. But I would like to emphasize in response that my question was not whether this kind of networking is worthwhile--it is--but whether and to what extent it's worth subsidizing. (Remember that some of that subsidy comes from, inter alia, student tuitions and the state fisc.) More particularly, the question was whether it's worth subsidizing all that a trip to the AALS entails, including the registration fee for the meeting itself, the extra fee for the annual luncheon (the one program that those who don't attend many programs are most likely to attend), the travel and accommodation costs, and so on, in cases where the person seeking the subsidy doesn't show up for many or any of the actual meeting events. At the best of times, financially speaking, I would find that a dubious proposition--and these are not the best of times. Defending professional networking is easy. Defending asking your law school to pay a registration fee in order to obtain a conference rate at the hotel and a conference nametag (to facilitate identification for networking purposes), but without actually attending the conference proceedings, seems to me much harder. To me, at least, that holds true even if the programs ought to be better. 

Whether the AALS takes attendance at individual programs and sends those data to law school deans or not, I think we can usefully ask what those professors who value professional networking but don't intend to attend many or any actual conference proceedings might do instead of seeking reimbursement for the whole conference package when they are only going to take advantage of part of that package--namely, the "lobby" or hallway and the chance to chat with old and new colleagues. Three possibilities spring to mind. One is that the professor simply pay his or her own way. As long as a law school reasonably expects that this person is actually going to attend conference proceedings and is offering to subsidize him or her on that understanding, this seems like the right thing to do. The second is that the professor "go to the conference" but not register for it, and thus limit him- or herself to networking in the lobby or elsewhere, without access to the nametag, the programs (which he or she didn't plan to attend much if at all anyway) and luncheon, the booths downstairs, or the conference rate at the hotel. (Of course, that person could always stay at cheaper accommodations in the city and then commute to the conference hotel.) If his or her law school were willing to subsidize that, on the view that there is sufficient value in networking itself (or because it believes the professor's use of his or her PDF is discretionary as long as it is related to academic purposes), at least it would save the school the cost of the registration fee itself. Finally, if the professor really wanted the conference rate and the nametag but had no intention of attending any conference programs, he or she could tell the dean clearly and in advance that he or she planned to seek reimbursement for the conference fee, hotel costs, and the rest of it, but without attending any programs. I would be curious to find out what would happen in such cases! But surely there is nothing wrong with being transparent about one's intentions with respect to using institutional funds--and conversely, there is arguably something wrong with not doing so precisely because one wants to "attend" the conference without attending any of the programs and fears that such a request would not be approved if it were made transparently.

Again, none of this is meant to disparage professional networking. (Although some dinners with friends are just dinners with friends.) The question is what law schools ought to pay for, and whether it's fairer, and would conduce to better decision-making and resource allocation by law schools, to know what they are paying for. (And, as I said in the first place, professors could always Skype with each other, or email, or do other things. No, it's not as good. But it's a hell of a lot cheaper. And, of course, there are conferences within one's specific field as well.) 

In back of this proposal, to be sure, is a general premise: I value the annual meeting as such, including the program meetings. Professional advancement is nice, and need not be viewed in purely mercenary terms. But the AALS is an annual meeting for professional education, including exposure to ideas and speakers outside of one's usual area of focus, not just for professional advancement. I think such a conference is or ought to be a valuable thing for committed members of an academic field. My views above would hold even if that weren't my background premise. But since it is, my "attendance" proposal is not only about encouraging candor, transparency to funders and stakeholders like law students and state legislators, and better resource allocation by law schools; it's also about making the AALS annual meeting itself better, by encouraging registrants to actually attend the programs--and, where subsidy is dependent on their doing so, incentivizing them to get involved in the sections or communicate with the AALS in order to make the program meetings better. 

Whether this second point holds might seem to have something to do with whether the AALS is actually a learned society or not, or whether it's something else. That's the point on which Mark and Dan offer some interesting and useful points, and I'll take it up in my next post.             

Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 11, 2017 at 09:45 AM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (0)

Goodyear v. Haeger oral argument

I have a piece on SCOTUSBlog covering Tuesday's argument in Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Haeger.

Here, I want to highlight (as I do in the SCOTUSBlog piece) the analogy offered by Haeger's counsel between litigation and a train. He explains that most sanctionable conduct merely delays the train or causes a detour, although the train still arrives at the intended station. Here, the “train jumped track and it went in an entirely wrong direction.”

But does a train continue moving in any direction, right or wrong, once it jumps the tracks? Isn't it more like the beginning of The Fugitive?

 

 

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 11, 2017 at 07:50 AM in Civil Procedure, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 10, 2017

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District: How vague statutory terms can lead to class bias in special education

Tomorrow SCOTUS will hear arguments in Endrew F v Douglas County on whether disabled students’ entitlement to a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”) entitles them to more than a non-trivial educational benefit. Both the statutory language (“appropriate public education”) and Board of Education v. Rowley (the governing precedent, calling for a plan “reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit”) are opaque. The indeterminacy of precedent and text leave an opening for the federalism canon of Pennhurst to resolve the case in favor of the school district.

Federalism, however, serves a purpose here deeper than acting as a tie-breaking canon. Pennhurst gives to elected school district leaders some power to temper the middle-class bias inherent in special education. By contrast, the mushy statutory standard of “substantial” educational benefits sought by the petitioners opens up a quagmire of litigation that only the middle class will be able to traverse. By defining "FAPE" to mean "substantially equal educational opportunity," the petitioner invite litigation over an unworkably vague standard. Inviting litigation, however, can only exacerbate the class bias of a statutory scheme already notorious for favoring wealthier and litigation-savvy parents through its litigation-oriented focus.

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Posted by Rick Hills on January 10, 2017 at 02:22 PM | Permalink | Comments (8)

The AALS is a Trade Association. There, I said it.

Paul Horwitz has a series of very thoughtful posts, each raising some important issues about the AALS and constructive suggestions for reforming the annual meeting.  There are some great ideas in here and as someone who has been (1) very involved in the work of the ass'n over many years, and (2) styles himself as a reformer of sorts (if only a "moderate" one), I find these criticisms and recommendations highly valuable, and some spot on.  Let's make the annual meeting great (again? once and for all?)

But let me tackle here an issue that undergirds at least a couple of these posts, as well as other AALS conversations in the past, and that is what exactly the association is.

It is an association of law schools, not an association of law professors.  Always has been.  Perhaps there is an important place in the academy for an organization of law professors (other academic professions have such associations), but that is not the mandate, the purpose, or the function of the AALS.  (No need to take my word for it; you can get the skinny from the charter up on the AALS website).  Prof. Mark Tushnet got us nicely riled up many years ago when he set out as the theme of his presidency, the idea of the AALS as a learned society.  Whatever power this had as a normative prescription, and as an exhortation to improve the academic programming of the annual meeting and other AALS conferences, it created a trap to which Paul and other distinguished law profs have fallen into, which is seeing the AALS as an entity whose primary purpose is providing professional development opportunities and good intellectual content for a hungry professoriat.  Worthy endeavors indeed (hence the great suggestions for improving the meeting), but AALS functions principally, and by design, to reflect and represent the interests of member law schools.  To be sure, it needs to be ever careful about ensuring that it effectively represents the interests of a very diverse group and, moreover, that its governance structures and institutions provide for adequate input so as to make it more likely that this trade association is advocating for causes and issues that are in the collective interest (as democratically determined) of its member law schools.  That all said, it ought not to shy away from its fundamental mission of advancing the interests of its member law schools.  (Where, of course, there are collective interests to be advanced and where the AALS has a comparative advantage in responsibly advancing them).

While the AALS surely ought to focus a good part of its attention and resources on providing meaningful opportunities for law professors to engage, to exchange scholarly and pedagogical ideas, and to develop mechanisms for improving the welfare of faculty members -- and in that sense Tushnet, Horwitz, et al, are quite right to push it hard to improve the meetings and meeting content -- we do our member law schools a disservice to evade and avoid squarely acknowledging its function as a trade association and an interest group.  The real question to me is how to develop a strategy so that, in its functioning on behalf of law schools, it is rigorously professional, data-driven, articulate, and not manifestly self-serving.  Therein lies the challenge; and a challenge built into the very purpose of the association.

Posted by Dan Rodriguez on January 10, 2017 at 01:02 PM in Life of Law Schools | Permalink | Comments (12)

Silence in the classroom

As we all start spring classes, I want to share an observation about the value of silence in the classroom. I am interactive with my students, even in my large class (Business Entities). One of the most fruitful questions I ask myself as I do my class prep is, "What questions would make a bright student who has done the reading think a bit before replying?" Those questions add particular value to the class experience because they're not something the students will get just by a careful reading of the assignment. They actually have to go to class to get that value. In turn, I feel an obligation to make the class time valuable to the students by asking questions that do more than reinforce a basic understanding of the reading.

But a necessary consequence of asking questions of that kind is that students pause before replying. Frequently they start a sentence then stop. All of that involves what can seem like considerable silence in the classroom. While the students are wrestling with a question, they are also dealing with the dynamic of silence.

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Posted by Eric Chiappinelli on January 10, 2017 at 10:43 AM in Teaching Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 09, 2017

AALS Annual Meeting Reform Proposals, Part IV: Visit the (Remainder of the) United States of America

This is the last of my posts on the AALS annual meeting, post-dating the meeting itself. Mercifully, it's also the shortest. My last, and probably most logistically difficult reform suggestion, is to rethink locations.

I know there is a history here, and also that the AALS needs to lock in its commitments years in advance. But I suspect I'm not the only one who is tired of shuttling between New York (great city, expensive, tiny overpriced rooms), DC (good city, lots of friends in town, expensive, unattractive hotel, exhaustion occasioned by too many trips to the Lebanese Taverna), and San Francisco (wicked expensive). It's a big country and, even keeping in mind all the needs that have to be balanced, surely there are other possibilities. I think it's time for other cities: Dallas, Atlanta, Chicago, Philly, Tampa, Birmingham, Charlotte, Salt Lake City, Memphis, Nashville, Pittsburgh....Some are expensive but many on this list are both accessible and much cheaper than the Big Three that the AALS has relied on for several years. (The last non-big three locale I remember was New Orleans; I'm not sure when that was, but a few years at least.) The AALS annual meeting is already something of a bubble, but there's something to be said for moving that bubble outside the usual bubbles of NY, SF, and DC. It is possible that some attendees might prefer to visit, say New York, than Pittsburgh, or San Francisco to Salt Lake City. But since the programs (or lobby, if you prefer) would be the same, I can't imagine why.

I'll round things out with a further comment about the "take attendance" post, and a post about AALS as learned society vs. trade association, although both will have to wait a bit. 

Posted by Paul Horwitz on January 9, 2017 at 06:57 PM in Paul Horwitz | Permalink | Comments (3)

Shorter White v. Pauly

Unless an officer walks up to an unarmed man and shoots him in the head while shouting that he knows the victim was not a threat, stop denying police officers summary judgment in excessive force cases.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 9, 2017 at 04:19 PM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (17)

Dialysis Care's Tangled Web

Thank you to PrawfsBlawg for the opportunity to guest blog this month. 

Christmas Day was the perfect day for the New York Times to publish its article on interesting goings on at The American Kidney Fund, one of the largest charities in the United States. Why? Well, Christmas Day is usually a slow news day and even trying to understand how dialysis care is funded for Americans is a slow read. It may be that all health insurance topics that span government-funded insurance as well as commercial insurance in the U.S. are a slow read. This is because our health insurance systems are complex but also because our health insurance systems are under-discussed.

Here, I am aiming for the fast read on the issues underlying  reports of recently issued subpoenas from the Justice Department to our two largest dialysis chains, Fresenius and DaVita. 

Renal failure patients have been  a special disease group under Medicare since 1972, when Congress extended Medicare coverage  to people of any age with kidney failure. The "kidney entitlement" (as it is sometimes known)  is distinctive in this regard. The story of the movement of dialysis from experimental to medical treatment, the rise of the dialysis industry,  and the sympathetic face of end stage renal failure patients all played a role in the dance of this legislation.  Indeed, a dialysis machine was reportedly brought to a Congressional hearing, though the account that a patient was actually dialyzed before members of Congress may be the stuff of urban legend. The early 1970's was also a time of  hope for comprehensive national health care reform, with the kidney entitlement seen by some as a stop-gap measure, not as an exercise in exceptionalism.   For all these reasons -- and more -- we saw the development of the extension of Medicare  coverage for dialysis to a disease group that included many who would formerly have been outside of the Medicare tent.

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Posted by Ann Marie Marciarille on January 9, 2017 at 11:16 AM in Current Affairs, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Less Hollow Hope on the defensive side

Judicial appointments always seem to be less of a high agenda item for Democrats than for Republicans. At the voting level, polls show that voters who identified the composition of SCOTUS and the federal courts as the most or a very important issue broke strongly for Trump.*

[*] On an AALS panel about the presidential transition, Steven Calabresi argued that this means Trump's promises about judicial appointments, especially to SCOTUS, are the equivalent of Bush I's "read my lips," to which Republican voters will hold him. If Calabresi is right, this will affect the result of any systematic Democratic efforts to oppose any Trump nominee.

At the presidential level, Reagan appointed 50 more judges in his eight years than Obama did in his, and Obama leaves office with about twice as many judicial vacancies (more than 100) than Bush II left in 2009. (So however Obama transformed the federal judiciary likely will be undone by Trump, who has a significant number of lower-court vacancies to fill immediately, along with the Scalia seat). Although Obama nominated and praised Merrick Garland and did speak about the waiting nomination, he did not do it so loudly or so often to keep the issue from largely disappearing from the news. I do not know if more political heat would have changed anything--if Republican voters genuinely care more about the courts than Democratic voters, there was no constituency to force Republican hands on this.*

[*] Which may offer another reason that Democratic attempts to hold the Scalia seat open indefinitely will fail--the Republican voters outraged at the obstruction will be louder and more numerous than were the Democratic voters outraged over Garland.

Some of Obama's less-than-complete success is due to Republican obstruction and that the Republican-controlled Senate has confirmed virtually no nominees during the past two years. But Obama had six years of a Democratic Senate, the last two of those without a filibuster on lower-court nominees (although still blue slips), which might have allowed him to push through a bigger flood of lower-court judges into those vacancies, had he been so inclined. (And this is without getting into judicial ideology, where Obama's (and Bill Clinton's) nominees never appear to be as liberal as Bush's (and likely Trump's) have been conservative).

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Posted by Howard Wasserman on January 9, 2017 at 09:31 AM in Civil Procedure, Constitutional thoughts, Howard Wasserman, Law and Politics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, January 08, 2017

One more round with Heather Gerken: Why federalism can still promote pluralism in our polarized times

Heather Gerken has written a typically smart and pithy response to my response to her response to my argument that federalism makes a great insurance policy against political defeat at the national level. I argued that, by limiting national power with formal rules, the Constitution can reassure Red and Blue voters that the other side will not impose their policies nationally. This allows Blue and Red states to go their separate ways on issues where disagreement is intractable.

Heather responds that federalism cannot promote pluralism in hyper-polarized times, because hyper-polarized politicians and/or voters just cannot stomach the idea of their opponents' imposing their views even subnationally. According to Heather,"[i]f you really think that what the other side is doing is monstrous, you aren’t going to allow for an exception to the national norm – which is precisely what is necessary for federalism to get up and running -- no matter what tradition or institutional practice holds." With her usual gift for a phrase, she declares that you cannot play cards in a hurricane.

In principle, I do not disagree: It might be that federalism could never contain fundamental moral disagreements like the fight in the 1850s over slavery. That was indeed a hurricane force wind that blew away any constitutional accommodation. After the jump, however, I will suggest that the sort of polarization afflicting us Americans today is more a tropical storm than a hurricane. It is nothing like the fight over slavery. Following Morris Fiorina's lead, I will suggest that the views of Red and Blue voters actually have not change that much over the last thirty years. We the People actually are not really that intensely polarized over issues. We are just intensely distrustful of each other. I suggest that firm, formal constitutional rules of federalism are actually ideal for containing this sort of polarization.

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Posted by Rick Hills on January 8, 2017 at 05:03 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)